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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-4590 
___________ 
 
GREGG L. SMITH, JR., 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LUZERNE COUNTY FBI AGENCY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3:12-cv-01205) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 21, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 10, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro Se Appellant Gregg L. Smith, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his complaint under 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Because the appeal does not present a substantial 
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question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Smith filed this § 1983 civil rights action against Defendant “Luzerne County FBI 
Agency,” alleging violations of his right to freedom of speech and “freedom of thought.”  
The District Court granted Smith’s application to proceed in forma pauperis.  The District 
Court then dismissed the complaint, sua sponte, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) 
(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.  Because the named 
defendant, “Luzerne County FBI Agency,” does not exist, the District Court interpreted 
Smith’s claims as against Luzerne County and held that Smith failed to plead a § 1983 
action against a municipality.  Additionally, the District Court interpreted Smith’s claims 
as against the FBI, finding that Smith’s cause of action was barred by sovereign 
immunity.  Smith appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to 
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a 
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  See id.  To survive 
dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  This Court affirms 
a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim “only if, accepting all factual 
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allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, we determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any reasonable 
reading of the complaint.”  McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 
2009).  We may summarily affirm if the appeal does not present a substantial question, 
and may do so on any basis supported by the record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 
247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
We agree with the District Court’s determination that Smith’s complaint fails to 
state a claim against the Defendant.  First, to the extent that Smith intended to bring an 
action against Luzerne County, his complaint fails to state a cause of action under § 1983.  
Municipal liability under § 1983 only arises if the plaintiff demonstrates that “‘execution 
of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose 
edits or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.’”  Andrews 
v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)).  A municipal policy encompasses a “statement, 
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s 
officers.”  Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690).  A custom, on the other hand, need not have received formal 
approval through official decision-making channels, but it “must have the force of law by 
virtue of the persistent practices” of municipal officials.   Id. (quoting Adickes v. S.H. 
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167 (1970)).  Furthermore, a municipality cannot be 
constitutionally liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See City of Canton v. 
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Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).  Here, Smith has made no allegations regarding 
Luzerne County’s policies or customs.  Therefore, his § 1983 claims against the 
defendant fail. 
Additionally, Smith’s complaint fails to state a cause of action to the extent that 
Smith intended to bring a suit against the FBI.  “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity 
shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”  FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 
471, 475 (1994) (citations omitted). Here, there are no allegations that the United States 
waived immunity.  Therefore, Smith has not stated a viable claim against the defendant. 
Accordingly, we deny Smith’s  motion for appointment of counsel and will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Smith’s complaint because the 
appeal presents no substantial question. 
